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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
The issue before the Court is whether an estate may recover against a defendant for 
property of the decedent that was held in trust, where the decedent was deprived of the 
distribution of such prope1iy solely through the wrongful acts of the defendant. More 
paiiicularly, the Court must determine whether its opinion of Bishop v. Owens established an 
absolute and universal bar to recovery for any claim that could be characterized as a tort claim 
when the injured party dies before judgment. If the Bishop v. Owens opinion did establish such 
an absolute and universal rule oflaw, then the defendant in this case will have succeeded in not 
only dep1iving her brother of his property, but also taking it as her own. If, however, the Court 
finds that the Bishop v. Owens opinion did not eliminate the well-recognized exceptions to the 
rule of abatement, then this matter should be remanded and the estate should be allowed to 
pursue recovery of the property that the defendant wrongfully withheld from the decedent. 
This case is about the actions of Toni C. Johnson while she served as the successor 
trustee for her parents of The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. 
Cornell ("Trust"). Ms. Johnson had one duty when she became the successor trustee of her 
parents' trust: distribute the assets to her and her brother, John Cornell. Instead of fulfilling her 
duty, Ms. Johnson refused to distribute the assets over two and a half years. She repeatedly made 
improper use of the assets for her own benefit and engaged in inequitable conduct in order to 
deprive her brother of his property. Finally, having failed in his attempts to persuade his sister to 
act in accordance with her duties, John Cornell petitioned the court for relief in July of 2012. 
Tragically, he died the following month before he could obtain a judgment for relief. 
In response to her brother's death, Ms. Johnson filed a motion to dismiss. She did not 
argue that she had acted properly. She did not argue that her brother was not entitled to the 
-1-
prope1iy under the terms of the Trust. She did not argue that she had honored the instructions of 
the Trust or her duties to her brother. Instead, Ms. Johnson argued that because she was the sole 
surviving child, she acquired all of the propeliy that was intended for her brother. She reasoned 
that her brother's estate could only pursue his property through a t01i claim and that such claim 
abated at his death under the Supreme Couli case of Bishop v. Owens. In sum, she reasoned that 
because she succeeded in depriving her brother of his propeliy until his death, she had the right 
to retain his property after his death. 
This Court must detern1ine whether Idaho law pennits Ms. Johnson to deprive the Estate 
of John Cornell ("Estate") of propeliy that was \Vrongfully withheld and wrongfully diminished 
only through the misdeeds of Ms. Johnson. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The Estate appeals from dismissal of its Petition for supervised administration and court-
ordered distribution of The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell. 
The magistrate couli dismissed the Petition on the grounds that the Estate's claims did not 
survive the death of John Henry Cornell. The District Court affirmed. Petitioner appeals. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The case identified by case number CV 2012-2 77 in Clearwater County was initiated 
through a Petition filed by John Henry Cornell on July 11, 2012. Jolm Cornell died from an 
apparent suicide on August 20, 2012. Ms. Johnson filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 17, 
2012, arguing that the claims in John Cornell's Petition abated upon his death. Ms. Johnson also 
argued that because John died, there existed no legitimate paiiy in interest unless and until the 
Estate was substituted into the action pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(l). 
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Kareen Cornell is the widow of John Cornell and the Personal Representative of the 
Estate. The attorney who represented John Cornell when he was living continued to prosecute 
the Petition in John Cornell's name, personally. In late November 2012, Ms. Cornell appeared 
before the magistrate court and notified the court that she objected to any other person acting on 
behalf of her late husband. While the magistrate court invited Ms. Cornell to submit briefing on 
the pending action, it did not bring her or the Estate into the litigation. Thus, Ms. Cornell's 
briefing was, in effect, amici briefing. On February 15, 2013, the magistrate court dismissed the 
Petition filed by John Cornell, personally, but expressly invited Ms. Cornell to file claims on 
behalf of the Estate. 
Ms. Cornell responded to the Court's invitation by filing the Estate's Petition on 
February 28, 2013. While many of the Estate's claims were identical to those raised by John 
Cornell in his August 2012 petition, the Estate also raised additional claims. The Estate's 
Petition alleged that Ms. Johnson (1) failed to act in confonnity with the terms of the Trust; 
(2) breached her fiduciary duties when acting in her capacity as Trustee; (3) engaged in equitable 
conversion of the property belonging to John Cornell by refusing to distribute the property; and 
(4) was unjustly enriched by misusing Trust assets for personal desires and refusing to comply 
with the terms of the Trust and her fiduciary duties in order to effect a distribution in her favor. 
The Estate sought supervised administration, court-ordered distribution of the Trust, and a 
judgment against Ms. Johnson for injuries caused to the Estate. The Petition set forth the 
following legal and equitable causes of action: (A) breach of fiduciary duty; (B) constructive 
trust; (C) breach of contract; (D) conversion; and (E) unjust enrichment. 
No Answer has ever been filed to those allegations. Instead, Ms. Johnson filed a Motion 
to Dismiss the Estate's Petition on March 1, 2013. The magistrate court granted Ms. Johnson's 
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motion on June 21, 2013. The magistrate court based its ruling upon the following conclusions of 
law: (1) the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion of Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616,619 (2012) stands 
for the universal and absolute mle that all claims sounding in tort abate at common law upon the 
death of the claimant; and (2) the Idaho legislature did not abrogate that rule with the amendment 
of Idaho Code § 5-327, except for claims for recovery of medical expenses, out-of-pocket 
expenses, and lost wages. 
The Estate appealed to the district court, and the matter was remanded with instructions 
that the magistrate court to first determine whether Toni Johnson ought to be removed as trustee. 
On remand, the magistrate court ruled that there were no persons with standing to request 
removal, because John Cornell's claims abated when he died. The court's abatement ruling was 
substantially identical to its earlier dismissal. The district court affinned. 
C. Statement of Facts 
Michael and Arlie Cornell established the Trust on November 1, 1996. 1 The Trust 
provided for Michael and Arlie during their lifetimes, with the remainder to be distributed 
equally to their two children: Toni Johnson and John Comell.2 Arlie Cornell died on 
November 9, 2008. 3 Michael Cornell died on December 15, 2009.4 Ms. Johnson has been the 
sole Trustee since that time. 5 
As a successor trustee, Ms. Johnson's sole duty was to distribute the trust assets; half to 
her and half to her brother: 
On the death of the surviving Trustor, the Trust shall terminate and the 
Trustee shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income and 
1 R. Vol. I, pp. 29-52 (Trust documents). 
2 Id. at p. 35. 
3 Id.atp.100. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at p. 51 (First Amendment to Trust naming Ms. Johnson successor trustee). 
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principal remaining in the Trust into two (2) equal shares and distribute 
them to the following beneficiaries: TONI C. JOHNSON and JOHN H. 
CORNELL. 
Trust§ 4.03.6 It is undisputed that Ms. Johnson never made any such distribution. 
The magistrate court found that Ms. Johnson "egregiously wronged her brother during his 
lifetime."7 Over the years she served as successor trustee, John Cornell repeatedly requested 
information regarding the Trust and requested its distribution.8 "Mr. Cornell contacted Ms. 
Johnson and her attorney, a different attorney than her present attorney, several times for 
accountings and for word on the status of the trust. He never received a response."9 He "waited 
in vain" for any sort of distribution that could help "pay for necessary medical care that he could 
not obtain without money from the trust." 10 Meanwhile, Ms. Johnson was living in the Trust 
home rent free. 11 "Ms. Johnson used funds from the trust for her personal expenses while Mr. 
Cornell was making his requests for information regarding distribution of the trust."12 She 
commingled Trust cash with her own, and then spent all the cash assets she commingled for her 
living expenses and expenses incurred maintaining and paying for the property on which she 
lived. 13 "Ms. Jolmson acted inappropriately in bestowing the proceeds of the trust upon herself 
and not shar[ing] one cent with her brother."14 John Cornell was never able to compel 
distribution before his death on August 20, 2012. 
Ms. Johnson has argued that because Mr. Cornell died before he was able to compel 
6 Id. at 35. . 
7 Id. at p. 603 (Magistrate Court's September 2013 Memorandum Opinion re: Attorney Fees and 
Costs). 
8 Id. atpp. 116-17, 126-38. 
9 Id. at pp. 602-03. 
10 Id. at pp. 602-03. 
II Id. 
12 Id. at p. 603. 
13 Id. at p. 429. 
14 Id. at p. 603. 
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distribution of the Trust, he held no prope1iy interest in the Trust assets. She bases this argument 
upon the following distiibution language found in the Trust document: 
If any child ... should die piior to the above distribution, then the Trustee 
shall distribute all of such deceased child's share to his or her surviving 
issue in equal shares .... If there is no surviving issue, then all of the 
deceased child's share of the Trust Estate shall be added to the shares set 
aside for the ... other living child .... " 
Trust § 4.03(a). 15 It is undisputed that John Cornell died without issue; the Personal 
Representative of his Estate is his widow. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. May the Estate pursue the property wrongfully withheld from John Cornell duiing his life 
by Toni Johnson? 
ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
The magistrate comi dismissed this action on a summary judgment standard, because it 
considered affidavits filed by the parties. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). An appellate court 
exercises de novo review over a grant of summary judgment. Constr. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. 
Assurance Co. of Am., 135 Idaho 680, 682, 23 P.3d 142, 144 (2001). 
Summary judgment is only appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving paiiy is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Idaho R. Civ. P. 
56(c). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the "Comi will liberally construe all 
disputed facts in favor of the nomnoving paiiy, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
from the record will be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party." Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 
399, 403, 195 P.3d 1212, 1216 (2008). "Summary judgment must be denied if reasonable 
15 Id. at p. 35 
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persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence 
presented." ivfcPheters v. J,.![aile, 138 Idaho 391, 394, 64 P.3d 317, 320 (2003). 
B. The Estate's Causes of Action Did Not Abate at Common Law. 
The Estate's Petition sets forth several causes of action in law and in equity. This Court 
has long held that, as a general rule at common law, tort claims abate upon the death of the 
injured party. See Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415,418, 184 P. 477,477 (1919). This Court has 
also long held that this general rule is subject to several well-recognized exceptions. Id. Four 
such exceptions provide for the survival of the Estate's claim in this case. First, tort claims 
survive where the claim is one for injury to property. Second, tort claims survive where the 
action is founded in contract. Third, the to1i claims survive where the claim is based upon breach 
of a duty established by a remedial statute. Fomih, tort claims survive where the action exists in 
equity. 
The test for detennining whether a claim survives "is, not so much the form of the action, 
as the nature of the cause of action." Id. (quoting Lee's Administrator v. Hill, 87 Va. 497, 12 S.E. 
1052 (1891)). Claims for injuries "which affect[] the person only, and not the estate," generally 
abate. Id. Examples of such claims are assault, libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false 
imprisonment, and the like. See id. See also MacLeod v. Stelle, 43 Idaho 64, 75, 249 P. 254, 257 
(1926). 
1. The Estate's tort claims did not abate because the claims seek redress for 
injury to property. 
The first applicable exception to the general rule of abatement is that "an injury which 
lessens the estate of the injured party does survive .... " MacLeod, 43 Idaho at 75,249 P. at 257. 
In Macleod, the Court considered whether claims for fraudulent representation of the value of a 
business were assignable. 43 Idaho at 69, 249 P. at 255. The Court looked to the law of 
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survival, because "[t]he assignability of a cause of action is ... intimately associated with, and in 
most cases held to depend upon, the same principle as the survival of a cause of action." Id. at 
75, 249 P. at 257. The Court adopted the rule that a claim for injury that "result[s] in the 
diminution of the estate of the injured party, survives and is assignable." Id. In Macleod, the 
Court found that claims for injury as a result of paying too much for a business based upon false 
representations by the defendant were claims for injury to property and, therefore, survived. Id. 
at 76, 249 P. at 257. The rule and reasoning of Macleod were recently reaffirmed and 
commended as reliable precedent in this Court's 2013 opinion of St. Luke's .Magic Valley Reg'l 
Med. Ctr. v. Luciani, 154 Idaho 37, 41,293 P.3d 661, 665 (2013). 
Nor is Idaho alone in holding injury to property is an exception to abatement. American 
Jurisprudence states that: "At common law survivable actions are those in which the wrong 
complained of affects primarily property and property rights, and in which any injury to the 
person is incidental, while nonsurvivable actions are those in which the injury complained of is 
to the person and any effect on property or property rights is incidental." 1 Am. Jur. 2d 
Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 51. 
Therefore, if the Estate's claims are for an injury to property, then the claims survive and 
the matter should be remanded. The Defendant has argued that the Estate cannot be claiming an 
injury to property, because John Cornell had no right to the Trust assets unless he survived 
distribution. However, while John Cornell may not have had a vested interest in the Trust 
immediately upon his parents' death, his interest vested when the Defendant engaged in 
inequitable conduct to delay distribution. 
"Unless contrary to settled principles of law, the intentions of a trust's settlors must 
control in actions involving the trust." Carl H. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 
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Idaho 866, 873, 993 P.2d 1197, 1204 (1999). If the settlors' intent is ambiguous, then the issue of 
the settlors' intent is an issue of fact, which focuses on the intent of the settlors, and may not be 
resolvable at summary judgment. Id. at 873-74, 993 P.2d at 1204-05. "In detennining whether a 
document is ambiguous, the Court seeks to detennine whether it is 'reasonably subject to 
conflicting interpretation.' Id. (quoting Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993, 997, 829 P.2d 1342, 1346 
(1992)). 
Here, settlors Michael and Arlie Cornell directed the Trust to tem1inate immediately upon 
the death of the surviving spouse. R. Vol. I, p. 35. The settlors directed the successor trustee to, 
"as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income and principal remaining in the Trust into 
two (2) equal shares and distribute them to the following beneficiaries: TONI C. JOHNSON and 
JOHN H. CORNELL." Id. The following paragraph then contains a distribution survivorship 
clause. If a beneficiary failed to survive distribution, then that beneficiary's share was to be 
distributed to his or her issue. Id. If the pre-deceasing beneficiary left no issue, then the 
beneficiary's share was to be distributed to the surviving beneficiary. Id. It is undisputed that 
John Cornell died before distribution and that he left no issue. This forms the basis of 
Defendant's argument in this case and her claim to the entirety of the Trust assets. 
Idaho courts have addressed the validity of distribution survivorship clauses 111 the 
context of will interpretations. See Allen v. Shea, 105 Idaho 31,665 P.2d 1041 (1983); Hintze v. 
Black, 125 Idaho 655, 873 P.2d 909 (Ct. App. 1994). In Allen, the testator's distribution to his 
wife was conditioned upon her survival of the distribution of his estate. 105 Idaho at 32, 665 
P .2d at 1042. The wife served as personal representative of the testator's estate, but died before 
she could accomplish distribution of the estate. Id. The Supreme Court held that the testator had 
clearly expressed his intent that his wife's interest in the estate did not vest until distribution had 
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been completed. Id. at 33, 665 P .2d at 1041. The Court of Appeals followed this precedent in 
Hintze, holding that a husband's gift failed to vest where the testator included a distribution 
survivorship clause and the husband failed to survive distribution. Hintze, 125 Idaho at 658, 873 
P.2d at 912. 
The Estate discovered no case where the Idaho courts have been presented with the facts 
where a personal representative or trustee unreasonably delays distribution. However, both Allen 
and Hintze suggest that vesting should be found where the personal representative or trustee does 
unreasonably delay distribution. Both the Allen Court and the Hintze Court consider California 
case law that sets forth the rule that vesting cannot be postponed by the unreasonable delay in 
distribution. See Allen, 105 Idaho at 34, 665 P.2d at 1044; Hintze, 125 Idaho at 659, 873 P.2d at 
913 (analyzing In re Estate of Taylor, 66 Cal.2d 855, 428 P.2d 301 (1967). Neither the Allen 
Court nor the Hintze Court reject the rule of law that vesting should be found where there is 
unreasonable delay; they implicitly recognize the validity of that rule of law. Id. Instead, the 
Allen Court and the Hintze Court explain that the facts of the case before those courts did not 
include evidence of undue delay. See Allen, 105 Idaho at 34-35, 665 P.2d at 1044-45 (finding 
"substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's finding that [there was no 
unreasonable delay]"); Hintze, 125 Idaho at 659, 873 P.2d at 913 ("the authority on which the 
personal representatives rely for this policy argument, [In re Estate of Taylor] involved 
unreasonable delay by the administratrix in distributing the estate, a factor clearly not present 
here"). 
Here, the Court is presented with clear facts of unreasonable delay and an oppmiunity to 
expressly adopt the rule which Allen and Hintze assume: that contingent interests will be deemed 
to vest where there is unreasonable delay. Such a rule does not frustrate the purpose of the 
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settlor, but rather carries out the presumed intent-that the desired beneficiary would receive his 
or her distribution so long as she survived the time reasonably necessary to make distribution. 
See In re Estate of Taylor, 66 Cal.2d at 858, 428 P.2d at 303.16 Furthennore, the rule encourages 
prompt distribution upon instruction by a trust and discourages the sort of dilatory conduct that 
occurred here. In this case, the Magistrate Court actually found that the Defendant's conduct 
:frustrated the clear intent of the settlors: 
Ms. Johnson used funds from the trust for her personal expenses while 
Mr. Cornell was making his requests for information regarding distribution of the 
trust. Ms. Johnson lived rent free in the home that is included in the Trust. 
Ms. Johnson entirely thwarted the intentions of her parents in establishing the 
trust for her brother to receive half the estate. Ms. Johnson dishonored the trust 
her father placed in her when he named her as the sole person responsible for 
distribution of the trust. Ms. Johnson acted inappropriately in bestowing the 
proceeds of the trust upon herself and not share one cent with her brother. 
Ms. Johnson egregiously wronged her brother during his lifetime. Now 
she wishes to continue wronging her brother after his death by not only keeping 
the assets that were intended for Mr. Cornell, but also raiding his estate for her 
attorney fees. Certainly, this is not the result that the parents of Mr. Cornell and 
Ms. Johnson intended when they created the trust. 
R. Vol. I, p. 603. 
Finally, even if John Cornell's interest had never vested, he still held a property interest 
that was damaged by the conduct of the Defendant. "A trust is not itself a separate legal entity 
that can own property; rather, it is a relationship having certain attributes." In re Thonipson, 454 
B.R. 486, 492 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2011). "A trust creates a fiduciary relationship in which the 
trustee is the holder of legal title to the property subject to the beneficial interest of the 
beneficiary." DESI/TRI V v. Bender, 130 Idaho 796, 808, 948 P.2d 151, 163 (1997). Here, the 
Defendant sought to totally deprive the decedent of his beneficial interest in the Trust assets. 
16 The In re Taylor's Estate Opinion also sets for the historic and widespread adoption of the rule 
that vesting occurs upon the occurrence of undue delay. 66 Cal.2d at 859,428 P.2d at 303. 
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2. The Estate's tort claims did not abate because the claims are founded in 
contract. 
The second applicable exception to the general rule of abatement is that the tort claim is 
not "unconnected with contract" but rather "is founded on a contract" such that it is "virtually ex 
contractu, although nominally in tort, and there it survives." Kloepfer, 32 Idaho at 418, 184 P. at 
477. Here, the tort claims are based upon a relationship that is founded in contract. The 
relationship between a trustee and a beneficiary is contractual in nature. See In re Thompson, 
454 B.R. 486, 492 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2011 ); and DB SI/TRI V v. Bender, 130 Idaho 796, 808, 948 
P.2d 151, 163 (1997). The scope and nature of that relationship is defined by the terms of the 
trust, i.e., the contract. 
The Estate has identified specific provisions within the Trust that Defendant breached. 
4.03 & 4.04: The Trust tem1inates automatically upon the death of the surviving Trustor 
and the successor Trustee is to distribute the prope1iy "as soon as 
reasonably possible." 
5.01: The only property which may be retained in the Trust after the death of the 
surviving Trustor is property productive of income. 
8.02: The successor Trustee shall render an accounting from time to time. 
The Magistrate Court dismissed these claims, interpreting Bishop as standing for the rule that 
where claims for recovery existed in tort, all such claims should be characterized as tort claims 
and found to abate upon the death of the injured party. R. Vol. I, p. 493-94. However, as set 
forth above, the Kloepfer opinion expressly recognizes that some tort claims may be contractual 
in nature and, therefore, survive. 
In fact, the Bishop opinion also recognizes this possibility. Furthern1ore, the contract 
claims identified by the Estate in this matter are far different than those pursued in Bishop. The 
question before the Court in Bishop was whether the decedent could pursue a legal malpractice 
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action through breach of contract claims. Bishop, 152 Idaho at 620, 272 P.3d at 1251. The 
plaintiff argued that it could either sue for legal malpractice or for breach of the legal 
representation agreement. Id. The Bishop Court actually held this theory conect. See id. The 
Court rejected the plaintiffs breach of contract claims, however, because the plaintiff had not 
alleged breach of a specific tern1 within the contract, but instead alleged breach of the term 
referencing the common law duties owed by every attorney to that attorney's clients. Id. at 621, 
272 P.3d at 1252. The Bishop Court explained that if such a provision were enough to transform 
the pure tort action of legal malpractice into a breach of contract action, there would exist "a per 
se breach of contract action in every legal malpractice action." Id. The relationship between 
attorney and client is not contractual in nature. Id. at 620, 272 P.3d at 1251. Here, the Estate's 
claims are far different; the Estate has identified clear and distinct terms in the Trust that the 
Defendant wholly and willfully breached. 
3. The Estate's tort claims did not abate because the claims are founded 
upon a remedial statute. 
A third exception to the general rule of abatement is that claims based upon protections 
granted by remedial statutes survive the death of the injured party. "A cause of action that is 
founded on a remedial statute, as opposed to one that is penal in nature, survives the death of the 
party possessing the cause of action." 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 59. 
Because the Estate's claims are for protections recognized by remedial statutes, the claims 
survive under this exception. 
Chapter 7 of Title 15 of the Idaho Code sets forth the standards governmg the 
administration of trusts. Chapter 8, the Idaho Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act ("Act"), 
sets forth the manner of resolving disputes regarding trust administration. The Idaho legislature 
expressly set forth the remedial nature of the Act. Its stated intent was to grant the courts "full 
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and ample power and authority" to settle "[a ]11 trusts and trust matters." Idaho Code § 15-8-102. 
The legislature provided that, in the case of doubt, "the comi nevertheless has full power and 
authority to proceed with such administration and settlement in any manner and way that to the 
court seems right and proper .... " Id. Further, the Act grants broad standing to interested 
pmiies, so that they might obtain judicial relief. See Idaho Code § 15-8-201. The facts of this 
case call for the courts to exercise the power, authority, and broad discretion given them by these 
remedial statutes to effect a result that is right and proper-a result that gives the heirs of John 
Cornell those assets which were wrongfully withheld and diminished by the wrongful conduct of 
the Defendant when she served as successor Trustee. 
4. The Estate's equitable claims did not abate. 
A fourth exception to the general rule of abatement is that claims in equity survive the 
death of the injured pmiy. "In equity, abatement signifies a present, temporary suspension of 
fu1iher proceedings in a suit because of want of proper parties. It is an interruption or suspension 
of a suit, the equivalent of a stay of proceedings, and the suit may be revived and proceed to its 
regular determination." 1 Am. J ur. 2d Abatement, Survival,_ and Revival § I (footnotes omitted). 
The p1inciple that a cause of action expires with the death or disability of a party 
generally does not apply to suits in equity; equitable remedies exist to the same 
extent in favor of and against executors and administrators as they do against 
the decedent, as long as the court can continue to grant effective relief in spite of 
the death. One of the main reasons for this stance for suits in equity is that 
such suits primarily pertain to property rights. 
1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 60 ( emphases added) (footnotes omitted). 17 
The Estate has raised several equitable claims entitling it to relief. 
17 See also Barnes Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merch. Ass'n, 128 F.2d 645,649 (4th Cir. 1942); 
Glojek v. Glojek, 254 Wis. 109, 115, 35 N.W.2d 203,206 (1948); Hughey v. Mooney, 282 S.C. 
597, 602, 320 S.E.2d 475, 477 (Ct. App. 1984); Miller v. Hayman, 766 So. 2d 1116, 1118 n.l 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) 
-14-
Conversion. ''At common law, the right to bring an action for the conversion of goods in 
the lifetime of the decedent owner generally survived to the personal representative .... " 1 Am. 
Jur. 2d Abatement, Sun1ival, and Revival § 76. Idaho law defines conversion as "[t]he act of 
wrongfully and permanently depriving someone of his prope1iy." In re Pangburn, 154 Idaho 
233,296 P.3d 1080, 1085 (2013). These are the exact elements alleged by the Estate. 
Constructive Trust. It is "the fundamental rule of equity that equity regards that as done 
which ought to be done." See First Sec. Bank of Idaho, 91 Idaho 654, 657, 429 P.2d 386, 389 
(1967) (discussing basis of doctrine of equitable conversion). When property has been acquired 
in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the 
beneficial interest, equity converts him into a trustee." TRUST, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 
2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Hanger v. Hess, 49 Idaho 325, 
328, 288 P. 160, 161 (1930). Thus, the doctrine of constructive tmst is a description of the 
nature by which a wrongdoer holds the property of another; the court deems that property as 
already belonging to the injured party at some earlier point in time. While the Idaho Supreme 
Court has not expressly addressed the issue of survival of constructive tmst claims at common 
law, it presumed their survival in Brasch v. Brasch, 55 Idaho 777, 47 P.2d 676, 678 (1935). 
Under the equitable doctrine of constructive trust, the express trust was terminated on the 
date at which the assets should have been distributed, and a separate constructive trust arose. The 
terms of that constructive trust were solely that the property belonged to John Cornell and that 
the Defendant was nothing more than a trustee over that property. It is undisputed that Ms. 
Johnson engaged in inequitable conduct by retaining legal title to the assets of the Trust in the 
name of the Trust. Certainly, reasonable persons could find that a constructive trust arose prior to 
John Cornell's death, based upon (i) the extended period of time between the death of Michael 
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Cornell and the death of John Cornell; and (ii) the undisputed inequitable conduct by Ms. 
Johnson. 
Unjust Enrichment. "Unjust enrichment occurs where [the offending paiiy] receives a 
benefit which would be inequitable to retain without compensating the [injured paiiy] to the 
extent that retention is unjust." Vande,ford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 557, 165 P.3d 
261, 271 (2007). The damages available to the claimant on an unjust emichment claim is the 
value of the amount by which the offending party was unjustly enriched. Bany v. Pac. W 
Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 834, 103 P.3d 440, 447 (2004). Like constructive trust, unjust 
enrichment is an equitable doctiine that seeks to return to the injured party those amounts which 
were due to him or her in equity; amounts which equity deems property of the injured party. 
5. Bishop v. Owens did not establish a universal and absolute rule of 
abatement. 
The magistrate comi granted judgment against the Estate based upon its interpretation of 
Bishop v. Owens as establishing precedent that, at common law, every cause of action sounding 
in tmi abates upon the death of the injured paiiy. R. Vol. I, p. 490. The magistrate court found 
the following language dispositive: "Under the common law, claims arising out of contracts 
generally survive the death of the claimant, while those sounding in pure tort abate." 152 Idaho 
616, 619, 272 P.3d 1247, 1250 (2012). While the quoted language from Bishop establishes the 
general rule, the Bishop Opinion does not-either by its language or its facts-stand for the 
proposition that the rule of abatement is universal and absolute. First, the very language of the 
Bishop Opinion states that the Court is reciting the general rule governing survival. Id. Second, 
the Bishop Court supported that general rule by citation to Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 184 
P. 477 (1919). Kloepfer makes express that which Bishop assumes: "As a general rule, in the 
absence of a statute providing otherwise, causes of action ex contractu survive, while causes ex 
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delicto do not. However, there are well-recognized exceptions to both branches of the rule." 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Fmihennore, the post-Bishop opinion of St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'! A1ed. Ctr. v. 
Luciani, 154 Idaho 37, 293 P.3d 661 (2013) does not support an interpretation that Bishop 
established an absolute and universal rule of abatement. In Luciani, the Court addressed whether 
a universal and absolute prohibition to assigning legal malpractice claims exists at common law. 
Id. at 41-43, 293 P.3d at 665-67. The Court held that while the general rule was one of non-
assignability, it was not an absolute prohibition. Id. The Court based its holding, in large part, 
upon the survival analysis set forth in MacLeod v. Stelle, 43 Idaho 64, 249 P. 254 (1926). Id. As 
set forth above, Macleod recognizes the exception language of Kleopfer and expressly holds 
exceptions exist to the general rule of abatement. A1acLeod, 43 Idaho at 75, 249 P. at 257. Of 
particular note, the Luciani Court considered and reaffirmed MacLeod while considering 
arguments from the defendant which were based upon the language of the Bishop Opinion. Id. at 
43, 293 P3d at 667. 
C. The Estate's Causes of Action Did Not Abate Under Idaho Code§ 5-327(2). 
The magistrate comi held that Idaho Code § 5-327 applies to all claims of the Estate 
arising after July 1, 2010. The court interpreted the statute as barring all damages potentially 
recoverable to the Estate and, therefore, abating the claims. The magistrate court erred because 
(1) Idaho Code§ 5-327 does not apply to the claims raised by the Estate in the case; and (2) even 
if Idaho Code § 5-327 were to apply, it would not bar the Estate from recovery for the property 
damage inflicted by the Defendant in this case. 
Up until its latest amendment, Idaho Code § 5-327 did not address survival of a claim 
upon the death of the injured party. On July 1, 2010, the Idaho legislature adopted amendments 
-17-
to the statute, providing for survival of ce1iain claims upon the death of the injured pmiy and 
adding subsection designations. Idaho Code § 5-327 statuto1y note. Idaho Code § 5-327(2) now 
states: 
A cause of action for personal injury or prope1iy damage caused by the wrongful 
act or negligence of another shall not abate upon the death of the injured person 
from causes not related to the wrongful act or negligence. Provided however, that 
the damages that may be recovered in such action are expressly limited to those 
for: (i) medical expenses actually incurred, (ii) other out-of-pocket expenses 
actually incurred, and (iii) loss of earnings actually suffered, prior to the death of 
such injured person and as a result of the wrongful act or negligence. Such action 
shall be commenced or, if already commenced at the time of the death of the 
injured person, shall be thereafter prosecuted by the personal representative of the 
estate of the deceased person or, if there be no personal representative appointed, 
then by those persons who would be entitled to succeed to the property of the 
deceased person according to the provisions of section 5-311 (2)(a), Idaho Code. 
Idaho Code § 5-327(2). The magistrate court reasoned that because the first sentence included 
the term "property damage" and because the limitation of the second sentence is not expressly 
limited to the antecedent of "personal injury" claims, the Estate could only seek "medical 
expense," "out-of-pocket expenses," or "loss of earnings" for claims arising after July 1, 2010. 
Because it found that the Estate was not seeking such damages, it ruled that the Estate's claims 
abated under the statute. 
When interpreting statutes, Idaho courts look to the intent of the legislature, and apply 
common sense and reason. See Smith v. Dep 't of Employment, 100 Idaho 520, 522, 602 P.2d 18, 
20 (1979). A review of legislative history and the language of the statute reveals that the Idaho 
legislature never intended for Idaho Code § 5-327(2) to apply to cases unrelated to personal 
injury actions. The discussion of the amendment before the Senate Judiciary and Rules 
Committee and the House Judiciary, Rules and Administration Committee centered around 
preserving the right of an estate to pursue "medical expenses and other actual economic losses" 
against the liability insurer of the tortfeasor. See Appendix- Idaho App. R. 35(/). The Statement 
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of Purpose associated with the bill explains that the amendment "will require liability insurance 
companies to pay for economic losses they have insured instead of requiring the children and 
other heirs ... to pay the medical bills and other expenses that were incurred because of the 
carelessness of another person." Id. The statute only mentions property damage in the context of 
economic injuries attributable to a personal injury action, such as a motor vehicle collision. 
This legislative history explains why an application of the language of the statute to the 
claims of this case is so unworkable. The limitation on recoverable damages in the second 
sentence begins with "medical expenses," a category that applies to personal injury claims, not 
prope1iy damage claims. "In determining legislative intent, this Court applies the maxim noscitur 
a sociis, which means 'a word is known by the company it keeps."' State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 
863,867,264 P.3d 970, 974 (2011). The maxim of noscitur a sociis requires that the category of 
recoverable damages be interpreted in like category to medical expenses. An interpretation in 
accordance with that maxim makes clear that the intent of the legislature was to preserve 
economic damages for personal injury claims, not to limit recovery for such claims solely to 
economic harm suffered. 
Even if the Court were to hold that Idaho Code § 5-327(2) applies to the claims in this 
case, the intent of the legislature compels an interpretation that permits recovery in this matter. 
The legislature intended to preserve claims for economic damages, not to prohibit them. As set 
forth in the Statement of Purpose, the legislature sought to protect estates and heirs from paying 
for economic damages caused by another. If the magistrate court is correct in its application and 
interpretation of the statute, then the legislature established the survival of property damage 
claims in the first sentence of the subsection, only to eliminate recovery for the large majority of 
those claims through the second sentence. Such an interpretation does not make sense either with 
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the clear intent of the legislature or with the language of the statute. If the statute truly applied 
and if the second sentence truly limits recovery on prope1iy damage claims, then legislative 
intent would dictate an interpretation that finds property claims fully-recoverable as "other out-
of-pocket expenses." 
CONCLUSION 
The issue before the Court is whether Idaho courts will pennit the Defendant to retain all 
the assets of the Trust and avoid any responsibility for her misuse of the Trust assets, simply 
because her brother died before he could have her brought to account. That result cannot be 
approved at law or at equity. Idaho courts have long recognized that the doct1ine of abatement 
does not preclude an estate from pursuing the type of claims raised in this case. The Estate 
appeals to this Court to reverse the ruling of the magistrate court and remand this matter for 
further proceedings. 
DATED this 28th day of April, 2015. 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
~~/. ~ 
uel T. Creason, ISBN: 8183 
orneys for Appellant 
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SENATE JUDICIARY AND RULES COMMITTEE 
February 10, 2010 
1:30 p.m. 
RoomWW54 
Chairman Darrington, Vice Chairman Jorgenson, Senators Lodge, Hill, 
McKague, Mortimer, Kelly, and Bock 
Senator Davis 
The sign-in sheet, testimonies, and other related materials will be retained 
with the minutes in the committee's office until the end of the session and 
will then be located on file with the minutes in the Legislative Services 
Library. 
Chairman Darrington called the meeting to order at 1 :30 p.m. 
Senator Kelly made a motion to approve the minutes of February 3, 2010 
as written. Senator Hill seconded the motion and the motion carried by 
voice vote. 
Senator Bock made a motion to approve the minutes of February 8, 2010 
as written. Senator Mortimer seconded the motion and the motion 
carried by voice vote. 
Relating to Civil Actions. Barbara Jordan, explained this fixes a 
problem in the law. Under current law if an unmarried person suffers an 
injury caused by another person and thereby incurs medical expenses 
and other actual economic losses but later dies from an unrelated cause 
prior to the responsible person paying for the expenses, the person or 
insurance company that caused the problem is no longer responsible to 
pay. However, when a married person in the same situation dies, the 
spouse is allowed to continue the claim. This change in the law will 
require liability insurance companies to pay for economic losses they 
have insured instead of requiring the children or other heirs of the 
unmarried person to pay the medical bills and other expense that were 
incurred because of the carelessness of another person. 
Senator Jorgenson made a motion to send RS 19442C1 to print. 
Senator Kelly seconded the motion. The motion carried by voice vote. 
Relating to Injury to Children. Senator Broadsword explained this 
legislation would change section 18-501, Idaho Code, relating to felony 
injury to a child. By adding an aggravated circumstance and increasing 
the maximum penalty to 20 years in cases where there is great bodily 
harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement to the child, the 
judges will have the flexibility to award stiffer penalties when the situation 
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SENATE JUDICIARY AND RULES COMMITTEE 
February 24, 2010 
1:30 p.m. 
RoomWV\/54 
Chairman Darrington, Vice Chairman Jorgenson, Senators Davis, Lodge, 
Hill, McKague, Mortimer, Kelly, and Bock 
The sign-in sheet, testimonies, and other related materials will be retained 
with the minutes in the committee's office until the end of the session and 
will then be located on file with the minutes in the Legislative Services 
Library. 
Chairman Darrington called the meeting to order at 1 :31 p.m. 
Senator Lodge made a motion to approve the minutes of February 10. 
2010 as written. Senator Mortimer seconded the motion and the motion 
carried by voice vote. 
Senator Hill made a motion to approve the minutes of February 17, 2010 
as written. Senator Kelly seconded the motion and the motion carried by 
voice vote. 
Relating to Rape; To Revise the Circumstances that Constitute Rape. 
Senator Hill explained this legislation changes the definition of what is 
commonly known as "statutory rape" as defined at 18-6101. Under 
current law, sexual relations (as defined) with a girl who has not reached 
the age of 18 is considered rape, even if both parties participate willingly. 
This bill amends the definition of statutory rape to include such acts when 
the offender is age 18 or older and the victim is under age 16 (rather than 
18), or the victim is 16 or 17 and the offender is 3 or more years older 
than the victim. Changes are also made to the male rape statute at 18-
6108 to bring it into conformity with the provisions of the female rape 
statue at 18-6101. This does not protect anyone over the age of 20. 
Senator Mortimer made a motion to send RS 19695 to print. Senator 
Jorgenson seconded the motion. The motion carried by voice vote. 
Relating to Producer Licensing. Roy Eiguren explained this legislation 
clarifies that the Director of the Idaho Department of Insurance has the 
exclusive authority to license bail bond agents in Idaho. The legislation 
further provides that the Director shall also regulate bail agent 
transactions subject to the inherent authority of the Idaho Supreme Court 
to regulate the procedural aspects of bail transactions in the Idaho court 
system. 
SENATE JUDICIARY AND RULES 
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MOTION: 
S 1340 
Senator Jorgenson questioned if all seven judicial districts must accept 
this rule as a uniform rule? Mr. Eiguren replied yes, this legislation will 
clarify that all seven judicial districts will be subject to the uniform 
licensing provisions of statutory law. 
Michael Henderson, Attorney of the Court, spoke in favor of the 
legislation, and reviewed the details of bail guidelines and statutory 
guidelines. 
Senator McKague asked what precipitated this legislation? Mr. 
Henderson replied this makes clear the authority of when the courts take 
action when there is misconduct and this shows communication between 
the department and the courts. Senator McKague questioned if they are 
currently required to have a background check? Mr. Henderson stated 
they are, but only by their initial licensing. 
Senator Jorgenson made a motion to send S 1371 to the floor with a do 
pass recommendation. Senator Lodge seconded the motion. The 
motion carried by voice vote. 
Relating to Civil Actions. Barbara Jordan explained that this fixes a 
problem in the law. Under current law if an unmarried person suffers an 
injury caused by another person and thereby incurs medical expenses 
and other actual economic losses but later dies from an unrelated cause 
prior to the responsible person paying for the expenses, the person or 
insurance company that caused the problem is no longer responsible to 
pay. However, when a married person in the same situation dies, the 
spouse is allowed to continue the claim. This change in the law will 
require liability insurance companies to pay for economic losses they 
have insured instead of requiring the children or other heirs of the 
unmarried person to pay the medical bills and other expense that were 
incurred because of the carelessness of another person. 
After reviewing the legislation, Ms. Jordan requested that the committee 
would send S 1340 to the fourteenth order for amendment because in the 
drafting of the legislation they neglected to make sure that the reference 
on page 2, line 35, actually should say "section 5-311 (2) (a). Currently 
the (a) is missing from the legislation. 
Senator Mortimer inquired if the language on page 2, line 33, where it 
states "if there be no personal representative appointed, then by those 
persons who would be entitled to succeed." Would this include a health 
and welfare claim, or an estate? Ms. Jordan replied, yes, if the 
subrogated interest currently have a rate to be reimbursed for those 
expenses and they can place things on the estate. This means the heirs 
have to pay or the estate then has to reimburse the subrogated interest 
for that and including the State of Idaho. This would then allow those 
heirs or the estate to proceed against the individual that actually caused 
the injury. Senator Mortimer stated, assuming there are no heirs, the 
State would then have the right to bring the action and to follow through 
with any claims in order to satisfy the obligation. Ms. Jordan responded 
that was correct. the state has the right to place a lien on the estate. 
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David Luker, Idaho Trial Lawyers Association, went to the podium to 
discuss subrogated rights. He also stated that they support sending S 
1340 to the fourteenth order for amendment. 
Senator Jorgenson questioned page 1, line 27, when it states, "those 
persons who would be entitled," would that exclude an estate if there are 
no persons? Mr. Luker stated the referenced would include everyone 
that is in Section 15-1-201, which is in the probate section, which is 
defined as heirs. 
Phil Barber, American Attorney's Association, stated that they agreed 
with the Idaho Trial Lawyers Association. 
Senator Bock made a motion to send S 1340 to the fourteenth order for 
amendment. Senator Hill seconded the motion. The motion carried by 
voice vote. 
Relating to Injury to Children. Senator Broadsword explained this 
legislation would change section 18-501, Idaho Code, relating to felony 
injury to a child. By adding an aggravated circumstance and increasing 
the maximum penalty to 20 years in cases where there is great bodily 
harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement to the child, the 
judges will have the flexibility to award stiffer penalties when the situation 
warrants such action. There would likely be no increase to the general 
fund in the first few years, but if longer sentences are handed down it 
could in future years add additional costs to the Department of 
Corrections. There are currently 176 incarcerated inmates who have 
been convicted of felony injury to a child. Of those, approximately one 
third or 58 inmates received the maximum sentence. There is no way we 
can know a definite number of increased costs. The department 
estimates those increased costs two years after implementation could be 
as low as $68,000 per year and as high as $236,000 depending upon 
how many convictions and how many of those convicted receive the 
maximum penalty. 
Holly Koole, Idaho Prosecuting Attorney's Association, spoke in favor of 
this legislation. Since it is difficult for children to protect themselves, 
actions against them warrants stiffer penalties for offenders. 
Senator Kelly inquired if this legislation had been reviewed by the 
Supreme Court. Patti Tobias, Administrative Director for the Courts, 
stated that the district judges review team was fine with the legislation. 
Senator Jorgenson made a motion to send S 1341 to the floor with a do 
pass recommendation. Senator Mortimer seconded the motion. The 
motion carried by voice vote. 
Relating to the Child Protective Act. Senator Broadsword explained 
this legislation relates to the Child Protective Act by amending section 16-
1619, Idaho Code, to include felony injury to a child on the list of offenses 
where the Department of Health and Welfare need not seek reunification 
with the parent. By adding felony injury to a child and serious bodily injury 
to a child to this list, the department can seek foster care and avoid going 
through a lengthy and costly judicial process which is not in the best 
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March 19, 201 0 
1:30 p.m. 
Room EW42 
Chairman Clark, Vice Chairman Smith(24), Representatives Nielsen, 
Shirley, Wills, Hart, McGeachin, Bolz, Labrador, Luker, Kren, Boe, 
Burgoyne, Jaquet, Killen 
Representatives Shirley, Wills, Labrador and Kren 
Bob Aldridge, Attorney; Sue Stadler; Daniel Lake; Michael Dennard, 
Judiciary; Tracee Crawford, Treasure Valley Grandparents as Parents; 
Marisa Mackley, Citizen; Georgia Mackley, Kincare Coalition; Patti 
Tobias, Courts; John Watts, Voices for Children; Vikki Miller, Idaho Voices 
for Children; Paul Panther, Attorney General's office; Barbara Jorden, 
Idaho Trial Lawyers Assn., Brandon Philips, Idaho Department of 
Correction, Diane Schwarz, Idaho Voices for Children; Fairy Hitchcock, 
Advocate; Director Brent Reinke, Idaho Department of Correction 
Chairman Clark called the meeting to order at 1 :30 p.m. 
Representative Bolz moved to approve the minutes of the meeting held 
on March 17, 2010, as written. Motion carried by voice vote. 
The Chairman recognized Barbara Jorden, Idaho Trial Lawyers 
Association to explain the bill. This bill fixes a loophole in the law. Under 
current law, if an unmarried person suffers an injury caused by another 
person and incurs medical expenses and other actual economic losses, 
but later dies from an unrelated cause prior to the responsible person 
paying for the expenses, the person or insurance company that caused 
the problem is no longer responsible to pay. However, when a married 
person in the same situation dies, the spouse is allowed to continue the 
claim. 
This change in the law will require liability insurance companies to pay for 
economic losses they have insured instead of requiring the children or 
other heirs of the unmarried person to pay the medical bills and other 
expenses that were incurred because of the carelessness of another 
person. 
The amendment simply adds an "(a)" on page 2 of the bill in line 35 which 
was inadvertently left out when the bill was crafted. 
Representative Smith moved to send S 1340a to the floor with a DO 
PASS recommendation. Motion carried by voice vote. Representative 
Smith will carry the bill on the floor. 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
RS19442Cl 
This fixes a problem in law. Under current law if an unmarried person suffers an injury caused 
by another person and thereby incurs medical expenses and other actual economic losses but later 
dies from an unrelated cause prior to the responsible person paying for the expenses, the person 
or insurance company that caused the problem is no longer responsible to pay. However, when a 
married person in the same situation dies, the spouse is allowed to continue the claim. 
" ' '' 
This change in the law will require Jiabi}ity "insurance corfipaniesto pay for economic losses they 
have insured instead of requiring the children or other heirs of the llnmarried person to pay the 
medical bills and other expenses that were incwred because of the carelessness of another person. 
, ... ,., . ': ' '' ( ~ 
None 
Contact: 
Name: Senator Joe Stegner 
Office: Rm. 430 
Phone: (208) 332-1308 
FISCAL NOTE· 











































LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Sixtieth Legislature Second Regular Session - 2010 
IN THE SENATE 
SENATE BILL NO. 1340 
BY JUDICIARY AND RULES COMMITTEE 
AN ACT 
RELATING TO CIVIL ACTIONS; AMENDING SECTION 5-311, IDAHO CODE, TO REFERENCE 
A CODE SECTION IN RELATION TO THE DEFINITION OF A TERM, TO PROVIDE A 
CORRECT CODE REFERENCE AND TO MAKE TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS; AND AMENDING 
SECTION 5-327, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE FOR THE CONTINUATION OF CERTAIN 
CAUSES OF ACTION RELATING TO PERSONAL INJURY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE UPON 
THE DEATH OF THE INJURED PERSON, TO LIMIT DAMAGES AND TO PROVIDE FOR THE 
COMMENCEMENT OR CONTINUATION OF SUCH ACTIONS BY THE DECEDENT'S PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE OR HEIRS. 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
SECTION 1. That Section 5-311, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 
amended to read as follows: 
5-311. SUIT FOR WRONGFUL DEATH BY OR AGAINST HEIRS OR PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVES -- DAMAGES. ( 1) When the death of a person is caused 
by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his or her heirs or personal 
representatives on their behalf may maintain an action for damages against 
the person causing the death, or in case of the death of such wrongdoer, 
against the personal representative of such wrongdoer, whether the 
wrongdoer dies before or after the death of the person injured. If any other 
person is responsible for any such wrongful act or neglect, the action may 
also be maintained against such other person, or in case of his or her death, 
his or her personal representatives. In every action under this section, 
such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case as may be 
just. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section, and subsection 
(2) of section 5-327, Idaho Code, "heirs" mean~: 
(a) Those persons who would be entitled to succeed to the property of 
the decedent according to the provisions of subsection (2+1) of section 
15-1-201, Idaho Code. 
(b) Whether or not qualified under subsection (2) (a) of this section, 
the decedent's spouse, children, stepchildren, parents, and, when 
partly or wholly dependent on the decedent for support or services, 
any blood relatives and adoptive brothers and sisters. It includes 
the illegitimate child of a mother, but not the illegitimate child of 
the father unless the father has recognized a responsibility for the 
child's support. 
1. "Support" includes contributions in kind as well as money. 
2. "Services" mean,:2_ tasks, usually of a household nature, 
regularly performed by the decedent that will be a necessary 
expense to the heirs of the decedent. These services may vary 
according to the identity of the decedent and heir and shall be 





































(c) Whether or not qualified under subsection (2) (a) or (2) (b) of this 
section, the putative spouse of the decedent, if he or she was dependent 
on the decedent for support or services. As used in this subsection, 
"putative spouse" means the surviving spouse of a void or voidable 
marriage who is found by the court to have believed in good faith that 
the marriage to the decedent was valid. 
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to change or modify the 
definition of "heirs" under any other provision of law. 
SECTION 2. That Section 5-327, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 
amended to read as follows: 
5-327. PERSONAL INJURIES -- PROPERTY DAMAGE -- DEATH OF WRONGDOER --
DEATH OF INJURED PARTY -- SURVIVAL OF ACTION. fil Causes of action arising 
out of injury to the person or property, or death, caused by the wrongful 
act or negligence of another, except actions for slander or libel, shall 
not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer, and each injured person or the 
personal representative of each one meeting death, as above stated, shall 
have a cause of action against the personal representative of the wrongdoer; 
provided, however, the punitive damages or exemplary damages shall not be 
awarded nor penal ties adjudged in any such action; provided, however, that 
the injured person shall not recover judgment except upon some competent, 
satisfactory evidence corroborating the testimony of said injured person 
regarding negligence and proximate cause. 
J1J.. A cause of action for personal injury or property damage caused by 
the wrongful act or negligence of another shall not abate upon the death of 
the injured person from ca uses not related to the wrongful act or negligence. 
Provided however, that the damages that may be recovered in such action are 
expressly limited to those for: (i) medical expenses actually incurred, 
(ii) other out-of-pocket expenses actually incurred, and (iii) loss of 
earnings actually suffered, prior to the death of such injured person and as 
a result of the wrongful act or negligence. Such action shall be commenced 
or, if already commenced at the time of the death of the injured person, shall 
be thereafter prosecuted by the personal representative of the estate of 
the deceased person or, if there be no personal representative appointed, 
then by those persons who would be entitled to succeed to the property of the 
deceased person according to the provisions of section 5-311 ( 2), Idaho Code. 
